The effects of self-minded behavior in congestion games have been studied extensively in the past twenty years. Initially, the focus was on the simplest case of complete information routing games where either the network was very simple-Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [3]-or the demand was infinitely divisible-Roughgarden and Tardos [6] . These articles and follow-ups captured the impact of operating a system at equilibrium, evaluated with respect to first-best solutions. This was quantified by worst-case welfare ratios, commonly known as price of anarchy (PoA). Different studies made different calls about a parametrization to highlight the sources of inefficiency introduced by the self-mindedness.
players in the game is represented by a binomial random variable with probability p and total number of players n. We assume that p and n are common knowledge among all players, but the realization of the random variable is unknown to players.
Even though the game we consider is a game of incomplete information, we show how the game can be transformed into a deterministic one by appropriately adapting the cost functions. This allows us to analyze it as a (regular) complete information game. For these transformed cost functions, we derive tight bounds for the PoA by using the (λ, µ)-smoothness framework first explored by Harks and Végh [1] and thoroughly studied by Roughgarden [5] .
Assuming that cost functions are affine, we compute the PoA and PoS (Price of Stability) as a function of p (see Figure 1 ). We show that the PoA is nondecreasing in p, and has two kinks. We recover the well-known bound of 5/2 for p = 1. On the other extreme, for p ≤ 1/4 the bound is constant and uniformly equal to 4/3. We show that these bounds are tight and are (asymptotically) attained on routing games with purely linear costs. Our model can be seen as a special case of the framework introduced by Kleer and Schäfer [2] . Our results complete both the upper and lower bounds for the PoA. Additionally, given that our example for the lower range of p has a unique equilibrium, our results complement the results of Kleer and Schäfer [2] and complete the characterization of the PoS. For more details, please see the full version of this paper at https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.03309 .
